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PRECEDENT AND AUTHORITY IN ANTONIN
SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE
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I. THE AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT
More openly than any other Justice sitting today, 'Antonin Scalia
is ready to reverse prior Supreme Court precedent. Scalia has an-
nounced that Roe v. Wade' should be overruled altogether, while
other Justices obviously unsympathetic to Roe have been unwilling
thus far to do any more than whittle away at it.2 Similarly, in death
penalty cases, a majority of the Court since 1982 has been cutting
back prior Supreme Court rulings without openly overruling them;3
in two recent capital cases, Scalia alone stated that he would reverse
prior rulings rather than join with unsympathetic majorities in confin-
ing their application.4 In yet another context, a Court majority re-
cently construed prior decisions prohibiting politically motivated
firings of government employees also to forbid patronage-based hiring
decisions;5 Scalia, in dissent, was not content to argue that precedent
did not require this further application, but maintained that the ear-
lier decisions themselves should be overruled.6
This does not mean that Scalia is always ready to overrule a pre-
cedent simply because he would have decided the case differently as
an original proposition. But in at least one case where he indicated
his willingness to acquiesce in an error, as he saw it, that the Court
committed in 1890, Scalia agonized openly and at length-notwith-
standing that this ruling had been unquestioningly followed for one
hundred years.7 The cumulative implication of his opinions in these
Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3065 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
3 See generally Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1782-1805 (1987).
4 Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067-68 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to
follow Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) or Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976)); South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2217 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advo-
cating reversal of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
S Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
6 Id. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating reversal of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)).
7 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2298-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (declining to overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
which held states immune from federal damage actions).
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cases is that Scalia does not honor precedent as such. Prior rulings
command Scalia's respect primarily when he sees independent reasons
that would lead him to decide the case the same way if it first ap-
peared before him today. If the precedent cannot be justified on this
independent basis, there is a presumption-apparently strong though
rebuttable-for discarding it.
At first glance, it might seem that Scalia could rely on distin-
guished precedent for this agnostic view of precedent. His attitude
seems reminiscent of Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous aphorism that
"[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." 8 Scalia might also claim
kinship with Justice Brandeis's observation that, although "[s]tare de-
cisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right," this policy does not hold for constitutional law specifi-
cally because "correction through legislative action is practically im-
possible" and the Court accordingly should follow "the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning." 9 There is, moreover,
strong practical precedent for reopening past precedents in constitu-
tional adjudication on which Scalia is also entitled to rely, in the
wholesale reversal of constitutional doctrine carried out by Franklin
Roosevelt's Justices. Scalia did indeed allude to this precedent in one
of his recent opinions, citing the arch-liberal Justice Douglas in sup-
port of re-examining past rulings 10 and noting that "[o]verrulings of
precedent rarely occur without a change in the Court's personnel.""
There is, however, a distinctive element in Scalia's attitude to-
ward judicial precedent that sharply differentiates it from these other
agnostic views. When Brandeis urged re-examination of past consti-
tutional decisions, he relied on the premise "that the process of trial
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the
judicial function."' 2 Brandeis also stated that prior decisions
not only may... have been rendered upon an inadequate presenta-
tion of then existing conditions, but the conditions may have
changed meanwhile [and m]oreover, the judgment of the court in
the earlier decision may have been influenced by prevailing views
8 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920).
9 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted).
10 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
11 Id. at 2217.
12 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 408 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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as to economic or social policy which have since been abandoned. 13
Holmes similarly held an evolutionary conception of the "path of the
law" generally. But for Scalia this conception, at least in constitu-
tional adjudication, is an anathema. Scalia emphatically rejects the
proposition that "interpretation [of the Constitution] must change
from age to age" 14 and that the proper function of the Supreme Court
is "to apply current societal values" in constitutional adjudication. 5
Scalia's approach to precedent is inextricably linked to his insis-
tence on original intent as the only legitimate source of constitutional
authority. In a recent law school lecture, Scalia acknowledged the
inherent difficulties of accurately reconstructing the intentions of
long-dead legislators and applying those intentions in the context of
radically different (and unforeseen) social circumstances.' 6 Nonethe-
less, he concluded, for all its "practical defects," originalism was the
preferable commitment for a judge. "[T]he main danger in judicial
interpretation of the Constitution," he said, "is that judges will mis-
take their own predilections for the law. Avoiding this error is the
hardest part of being a conscientious judge. . . . Nonoriginalism,
which under one or another formulation invokes 'fundamental values'
as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely to this weak-
ness." "7 Scalia accordingly discounts precedent not, as Brandeis sug-
gested, in order to free judges "to follow the lessons of experience"
but because past precedent is merely judge-talk and not necessarily
law, as he sees it.
Scalia's view of precedent thus hinges on his conception of what
deserves the encomium of "law." In another recent lecture,"8 Scalia
distinguished between "personal rule" and the "rule of law." Borrow-
ing a formulation from Aristotle, he stated that law as such must
"fram[e] general rules for all contingencies" and that rules which per-
mit considerable case-by-case discretion in their application, while
sometimes necessary, are "a regrettable concession of defeat-an ac-
knowledgment that we have passed the point where 'law,' properly
speaking, has any further application."' 9 Throughout this lecture,
Scalia developed an instrumental justification for this conception of
law: that it alone provided both the reality and appearance of equal
13 Id. at 412 (citation and footnote omitted).
14 Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989).
15 Id. at 854.
16 Id. at 856-57.
17 Id. at 863.
18 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. C11i. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
19 Id. at 1182.
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treatment,20 assured predictability in application, 21 guarded against
judicial arbitrariness, and promoted judicial courage in unpopular de-
cisions when judges "can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear
principle enunciated in earlier cases."' 22 On its face, this last observa-
tion seems to stand in some tension with Scalia's own professed will-
ingness to overrule past precedents. Indeed, Scalia seemed to praise
rigid adherence to precedent for the same instrumental reason that he
embraced rules of high, exceptionless generality. "[W]hen, in writing
for the majority of the Court," Scalia said,
I adopt a general rule, . . . I not only constrain lower courts, I
constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such differ-
ent facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the out-
come are quite the opposite, I will be unable to indulge those
preferences; I have committed myself to the governing princi-
ple .... Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.23
This is the same justification Scalia advanced for his commitment
to originalism in constitutional interpretation, and the conjunction
points to an ironic twist in Scalia's view of precedent. Scalia is pre-
pared to overrule more constitutional precedents more openly and
more quickly than his colleagues on the Court-but only for today,
only to construct a better future which would constrain him and all
other Justices. Scalia's overruling enterprise is not based on the ag-
nostic premise that contemporary judges should be free from the dead
hand of the past. Scalia's mission is to reformulate constitutional law,
by overruling contrary precedents which permit judges to rely on an
evolving conception of "fundamental values," to ensure that judges
must submit to this hoary grip.
Scalia thus seems to speak of precedent with a forked tongue: he
must overrule a raft of past judicial decisions in order to establish a
regime in which past precedents will be faithfully and rigidly fol-
lowed. There is, however, clear consistency in his position. Scalia
claims that the truly applicable past precedent-the original intent of
the constitutional authors-binds him just as he wishes others to be
bound. He does not see himself as exercising freedom in choosing to
overrule erroneous judicial decisions; he claims merely that in these
prior cases, judges wrongfully gave themselves freedom to depart
from textual commands, and that he and they are obliged to return to
original meaning and not to stray again.
20 Id. at 1178.
21 Id. at 1179.
22 Id. at 1180.
23 Id. at 1179-80.
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In Scalia's view of the binding force of precedent, judicial opin-
ions as such count for virtually nothing in constitutional law. If a
judge has correctly construed the document's original intent, this
opinion is worth respect; if not, then not (unless the judge's error has
become too deeply entrenched in practice-repeated too often, relied
upon too extensively-to correct without substantial disruptions).
There are many different bases for quarrelling with this view of
precedent. In one sense, Scalia's view is nothing more than a restate-
ment of his commitment to a constitutional jurisprudence of original-
ism, and there is an extensive literature critiquing originalism from at
least two perspectives. First, there is the hermeneutical objection that
the very process of recapturing the "original intent" of past lawgivers
inevitably involves reinterpretations rather than simple faithful repro-
ductions of the past. 4 Second, even if it is possible to read long-dead
lawgivers "in their own terms" rather than in some complex admix-
ture of their terms and ours, the originalist argument can be turned on
its head by demonstrating that the original lawgivers intended us to
take their words merely as starting points for evolutionary construc-
tions. The open-textured language of the Constitution-"equal pro-
tection of the laws,"25 "Privileges and Immunities of citizens," 6 "a
Republican Form of Government,"2 7 "freedom of speech, or of the
press"-surely suggests that the authors originally intended that
their successors should not be bound by their original understanding
of these terms.29
Scalia and his fellow originalists have rejoinders to these objec-
tions, but in this essay I do not propose to debate the merits of consti-
tutional originalism. I want instead to identify the general conception
of social authority that follows from Scalia's view of precedent and his
conjunctive commitment to originalism. Once his underlying correla-
24 For an elegant statement of this objection, see Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13 (1990):
While historical interpretation seemingly presents itself as a self-denying submis-
sion to the identity of past ratifiers, closer analysis reveals that that identity is
authoritative only insofar as we can be persuaded to adopt it as our own.... [T]he
authority of the Constitution ceases to stand apart from the processes of its inter-
pretation. That authority does not flow from the antecedent nature of the Consti-
tution, but rather from the particular relationship we have forged with the
Constitution.
Id. at 29.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26 Id. art. IV, § 2; see also id. amend. XIV, § 1.
27 Id. art. IV, § 4.
28 Id. amend. I.
29 For a persuasive statement of this paradoxical position, see Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
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tive conception of social authority is clear, it will be easier to evaluate
his attitude toward the binding authority of judicial precedent in con-
stitutional law.
II. Two CONCEPTIONS OF PRECEDENT AND AUTHORITY
To identify the differing underlying conceptions of social author-
ity that accompany different views of judicial precedent, it is helpful
to distinguish between two ways of comprehending the past: an "in-
clusively exegetical" and a "selectively authoritative" understanding.
The inclusive understanding is inclined to view the contribution of
past to present as seamlessly cumulative, and accordingly it gives
equal weight to the contributions of and contemporary obligations to-
ward successive past generations. The selective understanding, in
contrast, insists on clear hierarchical rankings to award much more
definitive respect to some past generations and events than to others.
This is not to say that the inclusive understanding views all past
events as possessing identical contemporary significance (so that
Shakespeare and Neil Simon deserve the same stature as cultural
icons, or that among the ancient Greek city-states the political experi-
ence and thought of Athenians and Spartans have equal importance
for us today). But the inclusive understanding insists far less than the
selective understanding on an explicit, hierarchically arrayed canon of
a respect-worthy past or of definitive rules for admission to canonical
status.
The distinction between these two understandings of the past is
perhaps best described as a difference in mood. The inclusive under-
standing approaches the past with open receptivity-more as a con-
sultation with and meditation about precedent. The selective
understanding scans the past with a narrower focus and, in particular,
with an eye toward using the past to extract definitively authoritative
rules in order to resolve specific contemporary questions.
The correlative conceptions of authority that follow from these
two perspectives can most easily be grasped by exploring analogous
interpretive practice in religious thought. In religious interpretive
practice, there is a clear difference between those who believe that
God is still directly accessible and those who believe He no longer
speaks to us but that His will and His meaning can only be ap-
proached indirectly through elaborate exegetical commentary on the
ancient texts. Practitioners of the exegetical method are invariably
less certain and more open to debate about God's meaning than those
who believe that God still speaks to us as He did in the days of proph-
ecy and revelation. Moreover, for those who believe that God re-
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mains directly accessible today, there is no reason to give any special
weight to others in past times who have offered their interpretations
of His word; if the source of Divine Authority is directly available and
speaks on His own account, why then listen to His imperfect in-
termediaries? In contrast, the practitioners of exegesis who no longer
imagine the possibility of direct access to God but approach Him only
through interpretation of ancient and sparse texts are much more at-
tentive to and respectful of past interpreters, and to the variety of and
conflicts in the accumulated interpretations, of His will.30
The exegetical mode-what I have called the inclusive under-
standing of past precedent-is thus a self-consciously collaborative
enterprise; and this collaboration works from an essentially egalita-
rian premise, both among present-day interpreters and between pres-
ent-day and past interpreters. Because God no longer directly speaks
to anyone, that is, there is no ideological basis for any single inter-
preter to claim special status as God's anointed prophet. The same
texts are available to everyone and the claim for special erudition or
agility in interpreting these texts must rest on persuasion, not on apo-
dictic assertions of self-evidently authoritative Divine sanction.31
30 In his richly provocative work on analogies between religious and constitutional inter-
pretative traditions, Sanford Levinson has juxtaposed Protestant and Catholic practices as cor-
responding to differential reliance on original texts or on those texts only as refined through
accumulated traditions of interpretations, and to different approaches toward the role of un-
mediated individuals or an intermediate priestly caste as authorized interpreters of text and
tradition. See S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). Levinson's categorization of
the two religions in these dimensions are more useful as heuristic devices than as complete
accounts of Protestantism or Catholicism as such. George Kannar has shown how Justice
Scalia's reliance on constitutional originalism-which Levinson would categorize as Protestant
in its fundamentalist impulse-corresponds to an important strand in Catholicism, in which
Scalia himself was educated. See Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L.J. 1297, 1312-20 (1990).
31 This is the lesson of one of the most famous passages in the Talmud, regarding the
dispute in which a majority of the sages determined the oven of Akhnai to be subject to impu-
rity according to Halakhah, the religious law. Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrkanos disagreed with this
conclusion, however; as the Talmud relates,
On that day Rabbi Eliezer brought forward all the arguments in the world, but
they were not accepted. He said to them: "If the Halakhah ... agrees with me, let
this carob tree prove it." Thereupon the carob tree was uprooted a hundred cubits
from its place; some say, four hundred cubits. They replied: "No proof may be
brought from a carob tree." Then he said: "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let
this stream of water prove it." Thereupon the stream of water flowed backwards.
They replied: "No proof may be brought from a stream of water." Then he said:
"If the Halakhah agrees with me, let the walls of the schoolhouse prove it."
Thereupon the walls of the schoolhouse began to totter. But Rabbi Joshua re-
buked them and said: "When scholars are engaged in halakhic dispute, what con-
cern is it of yours?" Thus the walls did not topple, in honor of Rabbi Joshua, but
neither did they return to their upright position, in honor of Rabbi Eliezer; still
today they stand inclined. Then he said: "If the Halakhah agrees with me, let it be
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What I have called the selective understanding of past precedent, in
contrast, does not at all depend on a collaborative process and rejects
any egalitarian implication in favor of a clear-cut hierarchical concep-
tion of social authority. This hierarchical conception is characteristi-
cally reflected in the style of discourse common to the practitioners of
this interpretive perspective-a tone of certainty, an inclination to-
ward authoritatively pronounced rules, an emphasis on clear-cut reso-
lution of conflicting claims. 2
There is also a profound difference between these two perspec-
tives regarding the importance of past precedent. For the inclusive
understanding, contemporary interpreters of the ancient texts can
never wholly disregard the exegetical interpretations of past genera-
tions because contemporary interpreters can claim no specially privi-
leged access to or authority over those texts. This does not mean that
contemporary interpreters are obliged to give binding or even pre-
sumptive force to past interpretations. Past interpreters have no more
authority regarding the meaning of ancient texts than contemporary
interpreters. And by parity of reasoning, contemporary interpreters
have no more authority over these texts than their predecessors. This
is the implication of the egalitarian premise as applied to the relation-
ship between past and present exegesis.
It might appear that the selective understanding demands greater
respect for past precedent, but this understanding actually collapses
the distinction between past and present. According to this perspec-
tive, the ancient texts are directly accessible to contemporary percep-
tion. This means not only that historically intermediate interpreters
can be wholly ignored; it also means that the historical status of the
ancient texts is irrelevant to their contemporary authority. The an-
cient texts record the voice of God; but since He still speaks directly
proved from Heaven." Thereupon a heavenly voice was heard saying: "Why do
you dispute with Rabbi Eliezer? The Halakhah always agrees with him." But
Rabbi Joshua arose and said (Deut. 30:12): "It is not in heaven." What did he
mean by that? Rabbi Jeremiah replied: "The Torah has already been given at
Mount Sinai [and is thus no longer in Heaven]. We pay no heed to any heavenly
voice, because already at Mount Sinai You wrote in the Torah (Exod. 23:2): 'One
must incline after the majority.' " Rabbi Nathan met the prophet Elijah and asked
him: "What did the Holy One, blessed be He, do in that hour?" He replied: "God
smiled and said: My children have defeated Me, My children have defeated Me."
Baba Metzia 59b, quoted in G. SCHOLEM, THE MESSIANIC IDEA IN JUDAISM 291-92 (1971).
32 David Weiss Halivni presents an illuminating discussion of differing conceptions in Jew-
ish interpretive practice, concluding that while the exegetical inclusive mode has been histori-
cally predominant, the alternative mode was more significant for some two hundred years
immediately after the destruction of the second Temple, as a direct response to this traumatic
dislocation. See D. HALIVNI, MIDRASH, MISHNAH, AND GEMARA: THE JEWISH PREDILEC-
TION FOR JUSTIFIED LAW 54, 64-65 (1986).
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to us, authority resides in His directly perceived commandatory voice,
not in the texts as such nor in their historicity. God may choose not
to alter or supplement His word, as it had been recorded in the an-
cient texts. However, within the religious exegetical tradition that ex-
alts the "original meaning" of the ancient texts over intermediate
historical interpretations, and accordingly claims the possibility of di-
rect contemporary access to the source of this "original meaning,"
God's voice is still available today and He might in principle issue
new commands that authoritatively displace the directives recorded in
the ancient text. From this perspective, therefore, the past warrants
no respect; past precedent has no binding or even persuasive force,
except when prior commands are currently reiterated by the God-
head-that is, when He actively chooses today not to change what He
commanded yesterday.
All of the elements that I have identified as characteristic of the
selective authoritative mode in religious interpretive practice are also
the central constitutive elements in Justice Scalia's approach to prece-
dent and in his jurisprudence generally. I do not mean that Scalia
commits the sacrilege of investing the founders with divine attributes.
I mean that Scalia sees his relationship as a judge to the founders in
essentially the same conceptual framework as those who believe in a
religious context that God is directly accessible to them, and that in-
terpretive exegesis of God's will is an unnecessary (and sacrilegious)
enterprise. We can best see the linkage between this religious concep-
tion and Scalia's approach to secular constitutional law in a criticism
that the Roman philosopher Seneca directed at Plato's exegetical ap-
proach to ancient laws: "I censor Plato, because he added justifica-
tions to the laws. Let the law be like the voice that reaches us from
heaven. Command and do not argue. Tell me what I have to do. I
do not want to learn. I want to obey." 3
This is the heart of Scalia's conception of law: that in its nature,
law's modality is to command, and the essence of the legal relation-
ship is dominance/submission. This is the underlying implication of
Scalia's insistence that rules of high generality, which give judges no
case-by-case discretion, are alone entitled to be called "law." This is
also the underlying implication of Scalia's insistence that the only
source of law is in its formally inscribed texts, and that judges must
not look beyond texts to discern implicit but unstated legislative mo-
tives.3 4 This conception of law and the legal relationship is antitheti-
33 Quoted in D. HALIVNI, supra note 32, at 5.
34 See Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1597, 1619-20 (1991).
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cal to the propositions that interpreters of the law engage in a
collaborative enterprise to add evolutionary glosses to the original au-
thoritative pronouncements and that the balance of the obligation to
respect and the freedom to depart from past interpretive precedents
derives from an egalitarian relationship between successive genera-
tions of interpreters. These propositions depend on a radically differ-
ent conception of law, in which law's modality is to solicit consent
and the essence of the legal relationship is mutually acknowledged
equality. The inclusive exegetical understanding of precedent follows
from this consensual, egalitarian conception; the Scalian, selective un-
derstanding of precedent follows from the commandatory, hierarchi-
cally authoritarian conception of law.
I have no difficulty in identifying my own preference between
these two conceptions of law; nonetheless, I am constrained by my
preference for the consensual, egalitarian conception against apodicti-
cally presenting this preference as if it were self-evidently correct. For
those who are not persuaded of its correctness, this is neither the
place nor the time to carry the conversation further. It is enough for
my present purpose of evaluating Justice Scalia's conception of judi-
cial precedent to show that his view is inextricably linked to a constel-
lation of attitudes toward law and the legal process, and that if you
adopt his view of precedent, his entire conceptual family comes with
it. It is enough for the moment, and it is consistent with my own
conception of legitimate social authority, to alert you to this implica-
tion of his view of precedent, and to leave the choice to you.
III. THE INTRINSIC AUTHORITY OF THE PAST
One additional aspect of Scalia's conception of precedent ampli-
fies the full dimensions of. the choice he has made. This aspect has
been identified by my colleague Anthony Kronman in his recent arti-
cle devoted to the proposition that tradition has intrinsic value and
authority. 5 Justice Scalia rejects this view; his commitment to the
original intent of the authors of the constitutional text is not based on
respect for the authors' ancestral status but on the positivist premise
that their text was ratified by the requisite constitutional formalities
and therefore binds us all. From this perspective, any contemporary
constitutional amendment enacted by the requisite formalities and ag-
gregated super-majority votes of Congress and the states-including a
wholesale reformulation of, say, the Bill of Rights or even the entire
constitutional document-would be equally entitled to respect. This
35 Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
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is not to say that Scalia advocates repealing the Bill of Rights or
shredding the constitutional structure generally. Because the terms of
his jurisprudence give no independent weight either to tradition or to
equality, however, there is no basis for a claim that a contemporary
super-majority should abstain from such action either because the tra-
dition of the Constitution deserves respect or because egalitarianism
demands respect for the contemporary vulnerable minority.
Scalia's disregard for the claims of tradition is not unique in con-
temporary jurisprudence. As Kronman has shown, none of the cur-
rently prevalent justifications for respecting precedent value tradition
for its own sake; the conventional accounts command respect for pre-
cedent either for utilitarian reasons (such as Scalia advanced regard-
ing predictability and judicial credibility) or for deontological reasons
(such as Scalia advanced regarding litigants' rights to equal treatment
in the outcome of like cases). These justifications, Kronman notes,
arise from "a timeless point of view" in which the past has no "inher-
ent meaning or authority of [its] own."'3 6 Kronman maintains that
this is a mistake and he draws on Edmund Burke to demonstrate the
moral claim that the past exerts on the present. Kronman relies on
one text in particular, a famous passage from Burke's Reflections on
the Revolution in France, which concludes,
By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as
much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fash-
ions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would
be broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men
would become little better than the flies of a summer.37
Kronman's extended reflection on this passage---on what truly
differentiates us from the "flies of a summer"-leads him to the con-
clusion that the accumulated, generationally transmitted "world of
culture" constitutes our "unique identity as human beings" even more
than our capacity for rational thought, 38 and that our "indebtedness"
for its cultural constitution of us forms the basis of our moral obliga-
tion. "We must respect the past," Kronman concludes, "because the
world of culture that we inherit from it makes us who we are." 39
I have some difficulty with this specific rationale for finding in-
trinsic value in the past. Although I agree that our accumulated cul-
ture is important in our conception of ourselves, our human self-
36 Id. at 1039.
37 E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 193 (C. O'Brien rev. ed.
1969), quoted in Kronman, supra note 35, at 1049.
38 Kronman, supra note 35, at 1064.
39 Id. at 1066.
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conception also crucially depends on our freedom from rigid genetic
determinism. To pursue the Burkean analogy, if we are not summer
flies who live brief lives with no awareness or acknowledgment of our
ancestors, we are also not insect drones like ants or bees who are ge-
netically compelled merely to reproduce our predecessors and to die.
It may be that this conception of human freedom is illusory; even so,
the subjective belief that we are free moral agents is a cherished ideal-
ization that is itself part of our transmitted culture. Kronman's con-
clusion, that we are obliged to respect our cultural past because it
constitutes our current identity, becomes trapped in the paradox that
our cultural inheritance includes a deep-rooted belief that our distinc-
tive human capacity is our freedom to redefine ourselves. Mark
Twain articulated the classic American expression of this ideal: like
Huckleberry Finn, we are free and inclined to "light out for the
territories."
Though I am thus not persuaded by Kronman's specific reason
for valuing tradition, my own account of the virtues of the inclusive,
exegetical understanding of past precedent is consistent with and, I
believe, a more adequate formulation of his basic claim that the past
has intrinsic authority. Our contemporary obligation to the past does
not arise because we are constituted by our forebearers. Instead, our
obligation to the past derives from the same fundamental principle
that comprises our obligation to one another among the living: our
commitment to consensual relationships based on mutually acknowl-
edged equality. This conception of equality is not a static command
to treat like cases alike. The equality ideal cannot be realized in a
single transaction or a series of isolated exchanges but only in an in-
teractive relationship purposefully sustained over a course of time. It
finds fullest expression in the ideal of marriage, a voluntary associa-
tion pledging mutual support, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in
health, a loyalty sustained even after death do us part.
This commitment stands against the impulse of the living to
override any bonds with past generations or obligations toward the
future simply because we are temporarily alive and strong. A society
committed to mutually acknowledged equality among all its members
cannot adequately acknowledge this commitment by drawing a sharp
demarcation between those currently living and those dead or dying
or very old, or very young or yet to be born. This does not mean that
the living are obliged to subordinate themselves to these others, to
submit to their oppression. It means only that we and they are
obliged to respect one another equally and-when this command can-
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not be fully honored because our needs and theirs are diametrically
opposed-to seek ways for the greatest possible accommodation.
Commitment to a consensual egalitarian conception of social re-
lations thus requires loyalty, though not subservience, to the past.
Justice Scalia's devaluation of the past, in contrast, follows from the
root principle of his jurisprudence-that the strong are entitled to
rule. All of us should remember, however, the fate prophesied for
those who live by the sword.
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